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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: Proceeding from a basic concept underpinning economic evaluation, opportunity 
cost, this study aims to explain how different approaches to economics diverge quite 
dramatically in their ideas of what constitutes appropriate valuation, both in principle and 
practice. Because the concept of opportunity cost does not inherently specify how valuation 
should be undertaken or specify how appropriate any economic value framework might be, 
the three main economics-based approaches to providing evidence about value for health 
technology assessment are described. 
Methods: The paper describes how the three main economic value frameworks – namely, the 
extra-welfarist, welfarist, and classical – are most typically understood, applied, and 
promoted. It then provides clarification and assessment of related concepts and terminology.  
Results: Although economic value frameworks differ, certain underlying characteristics of 
valuation were identified as fundamental to all approaches to economic evaluation in 
practice. The study also suggests that some of the rhetoric and terms employed in relation to 
the extra-welfarist approach are not wholly justified and, further, that only the welfarist 
approach ensures adherence to welfare-economic principles. Finally, deliberative analysis, 
especially when connected with a classical economic approach, can serve as a useful 
supplement to other analytical approaches.  
Conclusions: All three approaches to economic evaluation have something to offer 
assessment processes, but they all display limitations too. Therefore, the author concludes 
that the language of economic evaluation should be used with sufficient humility to prevent 
overselling of economic value frameworks, especially with regard to the qualities of the 
evidence they provide for priority-setting processes. 
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Introduction  
In a recent commentary piece in this journal (1), Professor Culyer usefully highlighted many 
of the issues in economics surrounding costs and context in health-economic evaluation for 
health-technology assessment (HTA). While making appropriate reference to both health 
economics and economics in general, Culyer neglected to mention that economics for HTA 
can encompass more than the extra-welfarist approach and that other economic value 
frameworks (EVFs) exist. Although his commentary helps to demystify the topic, still greater 
clarity and humility with regard to ‘economic’ perspectives on valuation could contribute to 
improved HTA processes. Indeed, assessing the quality and relevance of EVF outputs as 
information for priority-setting processes may become easier once the fundamental 
assumptions and value judgements related to EVFs are clarified. 
This paper highlights two main alternatives to extra-welfarist economic value frameworks 
(EWEVFs) – the welfarist (WEVF) and the classical (CEVF) – and it describes how both can 
inform HTA decision-making processes. Each of the three economic approaches here 
depends on particular sets of premises (in essence, ‘political’ judgements) as to which sorts of 
value count and the extent to which those dimensions of value are covered. Hence, as Culyer 
and Jönsson note (2, p. 2), these can be seen as vital for correctly judging the applicability or 
relevance of any given EVF.  
Theoretical understanding of opportunity cost 
This paper supplements earlier studies by clarifying several factors related to economic 
evaluation for HTA. Conceptual clarity is especially important both when defining 
opportunity costs and when actually carrying out any corresponding economic evaluation, on 
account of the implicit or explicit assumptions made, the limitations and uncertainties 
surrounding the measurement instruments, and the challenges involved in estimating any 
form of ‘economic’ efficiency. A clear, transparent approach is important also with regard to 
terminology: as Williams argued several decades ago, the role of economic evaluation in 
setting priorities for health technologies is easily oversold (3), and the relevance of this has 
been reaffirmed many times since (4, 5). Another important reason to strive for clarity lies in 
a shift witnessed in economic evaluation away from more welfarist views (6, p.64) and 
toward more narrowly focused extra-welfarist EVFs (7). Although the Culyer piece offers a 
textbook parable related to opportunity cost, it bears remembering that economists have 
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utilised the concept at least as far back as Adam Smith’s day (8, Book I, Chapter VI, p. 1). 
The term ‘opportunity-cost’ itself was coined by Green, with the thrust of his definition 
already involving ‘the opportunities foregone in accepting a certain line of action’ (9). 
Differences between schools of economic thought notwithstanding, Green’s definition seems 
to have been reinforced – by, among others, both Alchian (10) and Buchanan, with the latter 
stating that ‘opportunity cost is the evaluation placed on the most highly valued of the 
rejected alternatives or opportunities’ (11). Though there is fairly widespread agreement that 
economic evaluation is intended to inform HTA decision-making processes, how this 
principle gets applied in practical analysis of opportunity costs will reflect both the policy 
problems facing decision-makers and the research questions involved, along with the specific 
EVF chosen (1, 12).  
On the conceptual level, identifying opportunity costs entails a two-part approach: firstly, 
the value of the ‘new’ technology at issue is estimated or defined; then, the estimate obtained 
is compared to the value placed on the class of all ‘practicable’ alternative technologies, 
however specified. The first of the two evaluative components assigns a value to the given 
health technology relative to at least one other way of serving the same group. This valuation 
addresses not only the estimated additional resource requirements of the new technology, but 
also takes into account its effectiveness; i.e., this first valuation reports or estimates a value 
for at least one of the outcomes produced by the health technology. The second component 
places a value on what would have to be forgone for in order to supply the resources needed 
for the chosen technology. The objective of any reputable economic evaluation is therefore to 
provide evidence on whether the technology’s economic value (ascertained in the first 
component) outweighs the economic value of what is foregone (ascertained in the second 
component). The likely utility of economic evaluation for decision-making purposes is 
markedly lower when either of the two evaluative components lacks plausibility. 
Accordingly, this paper focuses on clarifying the nature of economic evaluations’ information 
inputs to priority-setting processes. From this perspective, it outlines the orientation of three 
EVFs, which, to varying extents, can address policy problems and identify different forms of 
opportunity cost (1). The aim is a critical review of economists’ attempts to adopt and 
operationalise these concepts, bundled as they are with particular aspirations, conditions, and 
premises. 
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Concepts of opportunity cost in practice 
There are three main ‘economics’-based approaches to determining whether a given 
technology’s economic value exceeds the value of any action forgone. Each type of EVF – 
the extra-welfarist, the welfarist, or the classical – imposes its own boundaries on how the 
valuation is undertaken. For each of the two components described above, the frameworks 
typically identify (or tacitly accepts) their own sources of ‘value’ and/or metrics thereof. 
These differences between EVFs stem predominantly from what is deemed to be of value, 
though EVFs also diverge in how the valuation is conducted.  
For a backdrop to examination of differences between EVFs, it is useful to outline the 
scope of investigations that are possible as part of the economic evaluation of health-care 
technologies. There are at least five distinct levels at which concepts of opportunity cost can 
be considered: I) choices from among particular portfolios of public expenditure (13); II) 
choices from among the technology portfolios that constitute the basket of publicly provided 
services (7); III) choices between treatments within the limits set for total disease-specific 
expenditure (14); IV) choices between mutually exclusive treatments (15); and V) estimates 
of what may be forgone through using a specific input to the production process, or ‘resource 
opportunity cost’ (16). The focus here is on level II, because the portfolio-of-technology 
level represents the most prevalent scope adopted by economic evaluations aimed at 
informing processes of health-care resource allocation (17).  
Differences between EVFs 
The objective for extra-welfarist approaches is often characterised as being to ‘maximise 
health’ (18), where the matter of how ‘health’ is defined can be considered very important 
because of proxying; typically in EWEVFs, rather than ‘health’ per se being maximised, only 
an indicator of health is maximised. Under EWEVFs, ‘health’ usually refers to the amalgam 
of 1) an indicator reflecting some dimensions of perceived health status with 2) ‘health-state 
valuations’ connected with that indicator (19). Both many of the indicators, and many of the 
valuations thereof, are typically engineered by health economists themselves. Although 
extra-welfarist approaches do not dictate a given maximand, most EWEVF applications 
centre on maximising a combination of precisely this sort of ‘social valuation’ of states of 
health with estimates of length-of-life impacts, normally operationalised in the form of 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). Under EWEVFs, the first evaluative component’s 
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output, typically a cost-per-QALY estimate, is compared with the second ‘output’, which 
represents ‘opportunity cost’ (an estimated mean cost per unit of health forgone through 
diverting resources from other activities). Thus, in principle, EWEVFs address whether total 
‘health’ will increase if the new technology is introduced, but do so with an implicit 
assumption that both the new technology and the activities from which resources are diverted 
are, as economic theory suggests, perfectly divisible with constant returns to scale. However, 
as noted by Drummond (6) and illustrated by Birch and Donaldson (20), ascertaining the new 
technology’s impact on efficiency (net impact on health) in a theoretically well-grounded 
manner requires avoiding such strict assumptions, which demands a 
mathematical-programming approach.  
The aim with welfarist approaches to economic evaluation is to maximise ‘welfare’, where 
analysis is undertaken to identify the improvements in the aggregate welfare of individuals 
(21). Valuation using WEVFs is based on the utility individuals gain from how the available 
resources are used, inclusive of any welfare impacts arising from the way commodities or 
outcomes are distributed within the population in connection with different uses of resources 
(22). ‘Social welfare’ or ‘well-being’ can be defined in terms of total net willingness to pay 
(WTP) (23), with contingent valuation methods constituting the main source of valuations in 
WEVFs (24). In more general terms, WEVF-based analysis compares the additional well-
being produced by the new technology with that forgone through diversion of the required 
resources from elsewhere to support the new technology.  
Finally, in classical approaches to economic evaluation, one of the central objectives is to 
supplement EWEVFs and WEVFs by accounting for preferences or values that are 
ascertainable only via deliberative methods. The label ‘classical’ refers to the long history of 
valuation in economics before such developments as the marginal revolution (25). With 
CEVFs, the goal is to identify and assess, rather than to define and maximise, ‘health’ or 
‘well-being’. That is, in place of a formalised maximand, the targets in a classical approach 
(26, p. 136) might involve satisficing (27) or sufficiency (28), in addition to interpreting, e.g., 
some EWEVF- or WEVF-derived indicator of ‘economic’ efficiency. Often, CEVFs operate 
with other, non-quantitative information too, and typically encompass deliberation (29). 
Perhaps their most important element is an attempt to avoid being constrained to focus on 
formal economic efficiency, i.e., on the type of neo-classical economic efficiency which is 
the result of quantitative or mathematical analysis.  
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EVFs, opportunity cost, and the two components of valuation 
As the name ‘economic value framework’ suggests, each EVF has its own approach to 
valuation embedded within it. Under EWEVFs, one frequent approach to judging what is 
forgone is to assume, both in principle and practice, that it is possible to quantify an 
opportunity cost and that this quantity is invariant to the size of the programme being 
evaluated, i.e., that there can be a fixed “cost per QALY” (30). However, this is inconsistent 
with the economic notion of resource scarcity and the general finding that the marginal utility 
of a good or service decreases as consumption increases. When EVFs employ comparison to 
some fixed monetary valuation of opportunity cost, they tend to ignore factors such as the 
potential budgetary impact of the intervention and the ‘lumpiness’ of health technologies (31, 
32).  
While all three EVFs entail estimating cost and effect differences for a new technology 
relative to a comparator, the discussion above should render it clear that there may be little 
deeper commonality in how EVFs assign value to alternative health technologies that might 
be displaced. The onus is generally on the user of the research to identify the possible 
implications of the chosen value system for the decision-making process it is purported to 
serve (33). The discussion below attempts to make the relevant implications clearer for each 
of the three main EVFs. 
Valuation and opportunity cost in EWEVFs 
Under EWEVFs, the first evaluative component in defining opportunity cost is generally based 
on cost-effectiveness analysis, which yields an estimate of the mean cost-per-unit health benefit 
produced by the chosen intervention – i.e., an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). In 
EWEVFs, this ratio, an estimate of the inverse of the mean rate of return on the additional 
investment required to fund the technology, is typically employed in an economic-efficiency 
metric entailing comparison with some predetermined benchmark ICER, i.e., some cost-
effectiveness-ratio threshold (CERT) (34). The latter is usually exogenous to the study at 
hand. Only rarely under EWEVFs do the activities displaced by the additional investment of 
resources in the technology get identified, or be valued, on a case-by-case basis. While some 
CERTs involve estimates from econometric analysis of possible relationships between current 
resource use and health-related outputs (35, 36), they may also simply represent an arbitrary 
figure or diktat (37). Indeed, CERTs will generally fail to fully reflect the actual displacement 
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resulting from the technology’s adoption (38). Many researchers continue to propose CERTs, 
of various types, despite evidence suggesting that thresholds are merely an economic 
abstraction and that a single appropriate CERT is likely to remain elusive in most contexts 
(39). 
WEVF-related valuation and opportunity cost 
Under WEVFs, analysis focuses on individuals’ preferences and technologies are evaluated 
for their impacts on ‘well-being’ (20). In some of these frameworks, the two evaluative 
components are brought together in a single model for analysis of portfolio choice through 
mathematical optimisation. By incorporating resource constraints into the model explicitly, 
thereby focusing attention on the well-being generated from the entire resource budget as 
opposed to a single programme’s share of that budget, the approach addresses opportunity-
cost considerations directly without requiring the separate valuation of the foregone 
alternatives that is typical under EWEVFs (40). Hence, the emphasis in WEVFs is on 
comparing across the well-being generated by various combinations (or portfolios) of ‘health 
technologies’ that the available resources can sustain, and on determining which 
combinations could improve ‘welfare’. In addition, the approach can accommodate any other 
concrete constraints on preferences, in line with policy considerations related to equity, need, 
etc. (40). It is also important to note here that, in practice, WEVF utilises WTP estimates 
which typically rely on methods such as contingent valuation to compare WTP between the 
new technology in aggregate and whatever must be forgone (41). 
Valuation and opportunity cost in classical economic approaches 
CEVFs can be viewed as a reaction to various limitations of EWEVFs and WEVFs in 
practice, especially as the latter are designed to ‘maximise’ via an objective function of one 
type or another. CEVFs represent an alternative approach, one that need not focus on a single 
maximand (as EWEVFs typically do) or on a single source of preferences (as is typical under 
WEVFs, the source being individuals) yet CEVFs can still be in line with conventional 
interpretations of opportunity cost (5).  
  
10 
 
How CEVF approaches can help in HTA 
In light of the above, CEVFs are proposed as an alternative that affords wider scope than 
either ‘health maximisation’ under EWEVFs or ‘maximisation of economic welfare’ under 
WEVFs, as they allow for qualitative use of preferences from groups of individuals, or 
directly from other stakeholders. Rather than rejecting use of the other EVFs, the CEVF 
approach supplements them with further information or deliberative analysis, such as 
incorporating community values (42) canvassed through various evidence-gathering 
processes (43-45).  
A CEVF approach can help inform HTA in three main ways. Firstly, CEVFs can add 
information to the evidence provided by EWEVF and WEVF approaches on the relative 
efficiency with which ‘health’ and ‘welfare’ are produced, respectively. While WEVFs may 
include strong evidence about budget- or resource impacts, additional, related information 
(with either a short or a long time horizon) can still be produced or utilised within a CEVF 
(46). Secondly, CEVFs can identify any qualifications or caveats to the EWEVF or WEVF 
findings, aiming to ensure that the information they provide is interpreted correctly, through 
an appropriate appraisal of their quality. While such appraisal is already addressed by many 
existing HTA processes, it could have greater value due to being integral to a CEVF 
approach, in line with an iterative, classical vision of valuation (26). The third main 
advantage would be that CEVFs can provide fuller awareness of the nature of the research 
question and its connection with the policy problem, as well as of the types and levels of 
uncertainty and relevance carried by information from other EVFs (47, 48). One major 
contribution that CEVFs can make to HTA processes is to force more clarity into the 
terminology surrounding EVFs. This point will be returned to below. 
CEVFs allow inclusion of dimensions of value that might not be measurable in the 
commensurate units ‘required’ by EWEVFs or WEVFs (49). Because they can account for 
informal analysis during an iterative process of deliberation, CEVFs could prove highly 
relevant for decision-makers (50). This might involve, for instance, A) confirming, doubting, 
or disproving the suitability of standard health-economic outcome metrics for the technology 
in question, partly through questioning the assumptions underlying information outputs from 
other EVFs, and B) establishing additional objectives or outcome measurements relevant for 
the technology in question (51, p. 149). For item A, deliberative analysis may assist in 
identifying any need to supplement other EVFs, because it is probable that no single 
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overriding ‘efficiency’ principle meets all the desiderata for allocation, and there may be 
good reasons to consider multiple prioritisation principles (29). For instance, some 
opportunity costs may not be quantifiable (52) and might lend themselves only to 
deliberation, as in the case of rights-based deontological or paternalistic considerations (53). 
In addition, with regard to item B, for some technologies there may be little pertinent 
quantitative information available from formal analysis, and stakeholders may hold diverse, 
conflicting views (54). The appraisal process may embody a range of considerations that 
might not all be well-defined prior to, or even during, economic evaluation. There are 
numerous situations in which deliberative analysis via CEVFs may provide a useful extension 
that improves on purely formal analysis, and a variety of evidentiary inputs may be used, as 
necessary, on a case-by-case basis (1, 55).  
In general, although analytic endeavours within EWEVFs or WEVFs can reveal some of 
the implications of particular choices (33), CEVFs may add a platform that stimulates 
discussion of more communitarian values (e.g., (56, 57)). With CEVFs, the aim is what some 
have called ‘higher-level efficiency’, rather than efficiency in the more neo-classical sense 
found in the more formal approaches of EWHEE and WHEE (58, p. 125).  
Discussion 
Each mode of economic thinking outlined in this paper can offer useful information for 
priority-setting processes, even though each EVF involves its own particular aims, 
assumptions, and value judgements. Whichever EVF is applied, evaluating opportunity cost 
requires some valuation of what is given up (59); hence, the aim here is not to denigrate or 
promote any particular mode of economic evaluation but to promote solid awareness of the 
information that each can provide. In all cases, it should be acknowledged that economic 
approaches to assessing opportunity costs are information-intensive in their input 
requirements and that their use often suffers from a lack of appropriate information (60), 
especially as pathways to health are often quite complex (61). One should also bear in mind 
that any method which gives consistent or accountable answers in a systematic manner is 
unlikely to yield truly comprehensive evaluation (62). There are many circumstances wherein 
measurements fail to cover relevant aspects of the changes in ‘states of health’ (32, 63) or do 
not capture changes in capabilities or in patient-reported experiences, not to mention the fact 
that ‘social valuations’ of such changes in health status do not fully capture society’s values 
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(5). On account of the measurement issues surrounding WTP, there may be many situations 
in which no valid and reliable methods of operationalising WEVFs exist (41, 64).  
Problems with the EVF lexicon 
While choice processes for allocating health-care resources should lead to transparent 
mechanisms for valuation of the various options and their opportunity costs (65, p. 138), 
terminology can make economic evaluation more opaque. This is evident from the declining 
use of terminology relating to intangibles and incommensurability, which could be seen as 
arrogant in a sub-discipline that often preaches humility. On account of space restrictions, the 
discussion here focuses on the terms ‘cost’, ‘threshold’, ‘decision rule’ and ‘value for 
money’. 
‘Cost’ has multiple meanings in both lay and specialist use, as Culyer noted when deeming 
it naïve to employ the term ‘cost’ for undesirable attributes (1). An alternative interpretation 
to that offered by Culyer is to take the undesirable attributes of an intervention as also 
representing a cost. Of course, at the level of valuing what may be forgone through using a 
specific input to the production process, or ‘resource opportunity cost’, i.e., at the level of 
building the pool from Alchian’s and Culyer’s examples, then ‘undesirable attributes’ should 
not be referred to as costs. On the other hand, the use of the term ‘cost’ for an undesirable 
attribute, a harm, or a negative benefit, could legitimately be used to refer to its part in an 
estimate of higher-level opportunity cost, i.e., when assessing the value of the pool per se. 
Indeed, at the portfolio-of-technology level, such undesirable attributes can be seen as an 
essential component of any EVF. Undesirable attributes are important when forming a 
valuation; Alchian expresses it thus: ‘The decision maker must choose among events that are 
amalgams of goods and bads’ (10). Therefore, in addition to the things forgone, such as the 
financial costs and the resources tied up, other aspects of the value forgone, for example, the 
‘costs’ in terms of harms to health will also have a legitimate place in economic evaluations’ 
definitions of (opportunity) costs (66). In practice, economic evaluations do typically include 
undesirable attributes in their analysis; for instance, EWEVFs do tend to utilise something 
akin to Alchian’s amalgam approach when they promote a metric expressing the estimated 
cost divided by the estimated incremental overall population-‘health impact’. For the 
purposes of HTA, it seems reasonable to suggest that any sound economic evaluation 
involves taking both pros and cons into account: focusing on both the undesirable and the 
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desirable attributes of technology, in line with the foundations of technology assessment (67). 
While, obviously, pain and suffering need not involve resources per se, the principle of 
opportunity cost encompasses the benefit forgone, so any robust measurement of higher-level 
opportunity cost should also take the ‘cost’, in terms of related pain and suffering, into 
account.  
Some extra-welfarist economists and even some HTA practitioners take the perspective 
that ‘thresholds’ can and should be quantified. However, economising in line with these 
assumptions may be less intuitive for others involved in prioritisation processes and seem 
rather perfunctory with respect to ‘societal values’ (68, 69). As is noted above, defining 
opportunity cost as a single threshold estimate can be seen as a typical economic abstraction. 
While economic evaluation must always operate at some level of abstraction in practice, the 
fairy tale of a single threshold (CERT), or threshold range, can be regarded as unhelpful. As 
no such one-size-fits-all threshold exists in reality, even within a well-bounded single 
jurisdiction, employing the term ‘thresholds’ seems to oversell EWEVFs. The problematic 
terminology is compounded by the use of connected phrasings such as ‘decision rules’ and 
‘value for money’. For instance, the real-world applicability of so-called decision rules of 
EWEVFs is crucially reliant on the framework’s inherent value judgements and assumptions. 
Indeed, these ‘rules’ are typically valid only within the confines of the EWEVF in question, 
and there is a danger that the term ‘decision rules’ could be construed to carry a similar 
meaning beyond this arcane hypothetical setting. Furthermore, claims of ICERs revealing 
‘value for money’ seem quite arrogant, in that EWEVFs often offer only a highly abstracted 
indicator of value. Although the concise term ‘value for money’ may be much easier to sell to 
HTA decision-makers than, e.g., ‘estimated mean valuation of estimated change in mean 
health status divided by the estimated change in mean health-care costs’, the former loses too 
much in precision; it seems much less honest. Since loose language could result in dire 
consequences of economic evaluation being oversold to the HTA community, it should be 
avoided at all costs.  
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Conclusions 
Rather than economists holding a uniform, all-encompassing view, there are three main 
approaches to economic thinking for HTA, accompanied by a multitude of ways to 
implement each of these. Instead of a single notion of economics embodied by one EVF, the 
study found EWEVFs, WEVFs, and CEVFs, each with corresponding problems and 
potential. Therefore, all approaches to economic evaluation should be checked for quality and 
relevance before being used to inform prioritisation processes. Applying more precise 
vocabulary, coupled with greater understanding of the limits to analysis of any kind, should 
help decision-makers engage in appropriate deliberation and interpretation in their HTA 
endeavours. The ways in which notions of opportunity cost are translated into practice and 
interpreted are likely to have great importance, not only for priority-setting but also for the 
long-term health and sustainability of health-care systems.  
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